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**ROLE OF POLICY AND STRATEGIC PLANS BRANCH
IN RELATION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
OPC'S STRATEGIC PLAN**

1. OPC has recently decided that its efforts in the past have not been commensurate with the magnitude of the problem presented by Communist Russia's attempt to dominate the world, and it is now engaged in seeking NSC and CIA authority to expand its organization and activities, this for the purpose of increasing the tempo of "cold" war operations and of increasing its abilities to support the military in the event of a "hot" war. All feel that OPC's expansion must take place in an orderly fashion under a so-called "Strategic Plan"; and that the size and scope of OPC's activities should be measured against the requirements of this plan.

2. At the time that the decision to expand OPC was made, OPC's Headquarters Staff was reorganized. This resulted in part in the development of a Plans and Operations Staff, which, modeled along the lines of the Army's General Staff, is to advise ADPC, and through ADPC the other Staffs and the Area Divisions, as to the formulation and execution of the strategic plan. The planning responsibility as a whole, including both "cold" and "hot" war aspects of the Strategic Plan, has been given to the Plans Division within the Plans and Operations Staff, and the former has, in turn, organized within the Division a War Plans Branch and a Policy and Strategic Plans Branch. The

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purpose of this paper is to propose the mission of the Policy and Strategic Plans Branch (PS) in the formulation and execution of the "strategic plan", and the means which it should employ to carry out this mission, this in relation, in particular, to the mission of the War Plans Branch.

3. It seems clear that the War Plans Branch is concerned principally with the development of plans in support of JCS planning for total war. As a result, it seems to follow, necessarily, that PS is expected to deal with the planning required in the waging of the "cold" war and in working with the War Plans Branch in merging "cold" war planning with total war planning to form one "integrated" plan. The balance of this paper is written on that assumption.

4. I am also assuming that OPC's "integrated" "strategic" plan on the "cold" war side can consist of several different and independent plans. For convenience and for orderly thinking, it seems to me desirable to recognize that the US has at least two independent, though related, "cold" war objectives, and that each of these requires several separate OPC planning efforts. The first of these is the objective of resisting further Soviet territorial expansion and of causing instability in the areas which Communism has already over-run. The second objective is to "roll back" the various curtains, or to recover for their Nationals territory already absorbed by the Communists, and to mount a direct attack upon the USSR which will weaken its power and

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will to wage "cold" and "hot" war, and which will ultimately lead presumably to the destruction of the Communist Government, and its replacement with a regime sympathetic to the coexistence of a free world.

5. It seems to me necessary that our "cold" war "strategic" plan should be composed of separate and distinct plans for the attainment of each of these two objectives. Thus, I think we should have area "resistance plans" to counter further Soviet aggression and to cause instability in the satellites and at the same time, have quite different and distinct "direct attack" plans for the attainment of the second objective. Although the two sets of plans will often make use of the same techniques and resources, the differences inherent in the purposes of each are sufficiently great to warrant their arbitrary separation. Thus, in the first place, the strategy of "resistance" plans will be essentially defensive whereas the strategy of plans for "direct attack" will be essentially offensive; and it is difficult to combine defensive measures with offensive measures in one strategy. In the second place, in our efforts at "resistance" we must locate our resources in, and focus our activities upon, many individual areas on the perimeter of the USSR. These areas, being local, must be treated individually in accordance with their special needs. Planning can proceed for the defense of one area largely independent of comparable planning for another area. Consequently, "resistance" plans must probably take the form of a series of area plans rather

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than one comprehensive overall plan. On the other hand, when we plan measures to weaken or to break Communist control over the Russian peoples or over the Communist-absorbed states, we should be focusing on one target under a comprehensive plan, which must embrace a great number of related activities in all parts of the world.

6. Aside from these reasons for separation, which stem from the nature of our national objectives, there is another compelling reason. This has to do with the extent to which the two sets of national objectives have been defined by NSC and by the Departments. National objectives with regard to resisting further Soviet aggression at various points in the world have been relatively explicitly spelled out. NSC has issued "area" directives and even "country" directives in some cases, which set up specific objectives in these areas and countries and which indicate with varying degrees of explicitness the means of reaching them. On the other hand, our national policies with regard to the fate of the USSR, and certainly with regard to the means of bringing that fate about, are quite vague. It is not clear whether we are to attempt to educate the present Communist Party and Government to "accommodate" itself to the conditions which we feel are essential from the point of view of our security, or whether we feel that this task is hopeless and that we must attempt to replace the present government with one which will subscribe to these conditions. The means of going down either path are nowhere set forth except in the most general terms. There being this disparity in the extent to which objectives and means are defined, and since OPC must have policy guidance, it follows that OPC's efforts

Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000100120035-6

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in the field of "direct attack" are likely to lag behind its efforts to resist further Soviet aggression. This being so, planning should proceed independently with respect to the objective of "resistance." Here we know what we are supposed to try and do. We can get ahead with the job, and, by proceeding independently, our efforts will not be hampered by the requirement, which will be a prerequisite to the mounting of direct attacks upon the Kremlin, of obtaining approval of assumptions and objectives and of means of reaching objectives.

7. Assuming that this distinction is valid for OPC planning purposes, what part should PS play in developing the two sets of "cold" war plans and in assisting in their integration with total war planning into that OPC "strategic plan" which is to be a guide for OPC's future growth and efforts?

1. MAIN STEPS IN DEVELOPING "RESISTANCE" PLANS TO RESIST FURTHER SOVIET AGGRESSION AND TO CAUSE INSTABILITY IN THE SATELLITES AND CHINA

1. In response to the directive in 51/3, a planning cycle has now commenced. This is to take form in the completion by PO/WP of their general OPC War Plan in support of [] and of force estimates for [], and the preparation by the Area Divisions of "detailed estimates logistics requirements" for personnel and material necessary for the execution of both "cold" and "hot" war plans. The Divisions are also to prepare division "strategic plans" which will summarize program assumptions underlying the logistics requirements estimates.

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2. These plans will be based for total war plans purposes on JCS assumptions and in the "cold" war field, according to 51/2, on the assumption that our aims are:

- a. Stabilization of the free world with measures to cause instability in the satellite states and China.
- b. An effort to roll back Soviet conquest over the satellites and China when our military shield is sufficiently strong, and
- c. At all times and as feasible, measures of direct attack upon the USSR itself, these leading to the destruction of the Communist Government of the USSR and its replacement with a regime sympathetic to the free world.

3. These plans are to be completed in the latter part of April.

4. It seems to me that while this planning is in motion, PO/PS should do the following:

- a. Identify and inventory national policies originating in NSC and in the Departments affecting "resistance" in the areas, with particular attention to OPC's role, whether explicit or implicit.
- b. Prepare a statement of the basic assumptions which underlie these policies and on which programs to carry out the policies must be based. To be useful, this statement should be complete and therefore should include total war plan assumptions.

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- c. Give a. and b. to the Divisions, b. as a working paper, and at the same time submit b. to the Consultants for approval. Upon its approval, the assumptions would become binding upon the Divisions.
- 5. When the strategic plans have been received from the Divisions:
 - d. Assess the validity of the "cold" war program objectives against the national policies referred to in a. and the assumptions referred to in b., determine whether enough emphasis, or too much, is being placed on particular objectives.
 - e. Investigate the desirability of adding new program objectives in support of the policies - these to be obtained through functional experts in EW, PW, PM, in a. - etc., and through the advice of outside consultants.
 - f. "Integrate" the revised objectives with war plan objectives in order to determine whether there are conflicts which should be resolved, and whether there are common objectives, or different objectives which can be reached through the same Area resources. The purpose of this "integration" would be to determine the minimum level of logistics support necessary in the satisfaction of all valid program requirements.
 - g. Working with the Divisions, WP and AL, adjust the program objectives in the light of the probable growth of logistics capabilities. In cases where capabilities are in short supply, and where the choice might have

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to be between a war plan objective and a "cold" war objective, this adjustment would require agreement with War Plans as to the relative priorities of the two objectives.

- h. Submit the combined War Plan and "cold" war statement of program objectives to higher authority for approval. This submission would take the form, presumably, of a series of area plans.
- i. Send the approved objectives to the Area Divisions, which would then revise their present operations to match the programs called for by the approved objectives.

6. These steps seem to make up the task which immediately faces us in the development of "stabilization" plans, and I assume that it is a task which must and can be completed very rapidly; e.g., within the next two months. After this job has been completed, it seems to me that the PS function will be that of monitoring and supervising the changes in the program objectives which will be constantly taking place. This will involve remaining alert to changes in the world situation as they affect the areas, obtaining policy guidance for program changes, reaching agreement with WP as to changes which affect existing priorities on the use of resources, keeping under constant review the assumptions referred to in b. and changing them as required.

7. In sum, with respect to this part of OPC's Strategic Plan, PS will review more than it will originate. It will ensure that national policies are being followed. It will seek policy guidance where none exists. It will ensure that all functional techniques are

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made available to the Divisions for exploitation. It will not, however, perform very much, if any, original planning. This, PS will leave to the Divisions where presumably the specialized area knowledge exists, necessary to successful carrying out in each area of program objectives.

II. PLANS FOR AGGRESSIVE ACTION AGAINST THE SOURCES OF COMMUNIST POWER WITHIN THE USSR - DIRECT ATTACK

1. These plans will be concerned with actions which are directed at the USSR itself. Among others, they will be concerned with those objectives of NSC 68 which are aggressive rather than defensive in character; e.g., an exposure of the falsities of Soviet pretensions; "retraction of the Kremlin control and influence;" the fostering of "the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards;" a reduction of the "power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union and other areas under its control."

2. OPC appears to have undertaken relatively little in the way of aggressive action against the USSR. There are several reasons for this lack of activity. In the first place, the presumed unfeasibility of doing much has appeared to be a strong limiting factor. Second, as noted above, our national purpose with regards to aggressive action against the Soviet Union has not been defined with any particularity, and lacking clear cut objective it has been impossible to postulate main lines of action. Third, it is likely that the existence of a war plan which, except for strategic air attack, has been

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concerned principally with perimeter areas, has created a strong pull towards planning activities which are concerned with the support of war plans in the areas.

3. The lack of development of national policies has probably resulted for another reason, which bears directly upon OPC's role. The US has recognized that a global war would be a catastrophe and that it must be avoided at all costs short of impairment of US security interests. This recognition has resulted in denying strongly the concept of preventive war and in avoiding any overt aggressive action against the USSR which might tend to bring about such a war. On the covert side, we are working under similar limitations, as evidenced, for example, in our national reluctance to take action in bringing about the defection of Albania. On the other hand, we do have the opportunity to be more aggressive covertly and in the very effective combination of covert with overt, than we may be through overt action alone. We can probably seek goals covertly, or in combination, which we would not dare seek overtly. It will be feasible to reach some of these goals. A determination of the feasible goals would form the basis for national policy. However, since the possibilities of the covert are understood by relatively few in our government, it is likely that unless OPC itself proposes the objectives which can be attained covertly, national policies of "direct attack" may well continue to remain relatively unformulated.

4. Perhaps this is a large view of OPC's role and opportunity. However, to the extent that it is valid, OPC has a responsibility which probably only OPC can discharge. This is to affirmatively provide guidance to national policy objectives which can be attained covertly,

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in whole or in part, without undue risk of provoking war, and to seek the incorporation of these objectives in national policy.

5. Before this guidance can be given, however, OPC must learn much more than it now knows about its own business. It must make a much more intensive effort to analyze the weaknesses of Communist Russia which are susceptible of exploitation through covert attack. It must determine the covert weapons which will take advantage of these weaknesses most effectively, whether they are in existence now or, from what is now known, whether they can be developed. It must develop strategies for the use of these weapons. Finally, it must appraise the risks of provoking war by the use of the strategies. Having done so, it will be in a position to recommend particular objectives to MSC and, in this fashion, to assist in formulating national policies in an area where now relatively few exist.

6. PS should take the lead in assisting OPC to discharge these responsibilities. In order to do so, PS should, in broad terms:

- a. Arrange for an intensive and continuing investigation of the vulnerabilities of Communist Russia to various forms of covert attack.
- b. Arrange for an intensive investigation of the possibilities of developing new covert weapons and techniques for use in taking advantage of these weaknesses.
- c. Develop judgments as to those objectives which can be attained through the use of such weapons, without provoking war.

- d. Prepare policy proposals for the incorporation of these

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- e. Coordinate the development of the strategies for the attainment of these objectives; assist in allocating operational responsibilities and the determination and satisfaction of logistic requirements.

In this phase of its efforts PS would itself propose the objectives to be sought rather than review objectives proposed by the area divisions. It would insure that these objectives are in support of national policies; however, in many cases, this would require first formulating and proposing for adoption by higher authority the national policies. PS would not, of course, be responsible for the execution of the programs after they had been adopted. This responsibility would be given to some other component of OPC. However, since these programs would involve usually a coordinated effort on the part of two or three area divisions, it is unlikely that the operating responsibility could properly be given to any single area division. Presumably, the responsibility for carrying out these programs should be given either to a division such as SP, whose jurisdiction is world-wide, or divided among the proposed functional divisions according to the predominant functional nature of the particular program.

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With the hope and on the assumption that the foregoing represents a workable approach to the development of OPC's Strategic Plan, I suggest that:

- a. PS, under the direction of CPO and CPD be authorized to carry out the functions described in I-2 and 4 and II-6.
- b. PS be authorized to prepare a TO adequate for the carrying out of these functions.

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